Discount Brokers

Dhan and Zerodha Run the Same Business.

Dhan and Zerodha look like different companies. The audited numbers say they're the same business at different points on the same curve. Only time separates them.

06 May 2026

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5 min

Discount Brokers

Side-by-side audit

Company A

Solid

Dhan

Fintech / Stock Broker / Trading Platform

FY2025 Revenue

₹877 Cr

FY2025 PAT

+₹408 Cr

Full Dhan breakdown →

Company B

Solid

Zerodha

Fintech / Stock Broking

Revenue FY2025 (-11.5% from record FY2024)

₹8,810 Cr

PAT, 48% net margin

₹4,232 Cr

Full Zerodha breakdown →

The 30-Second Summary

Dhan and Zerodha look like different companies.

The numbers say they're the same business.

  • Same margins, both ~47% net.
  • Same model, flat-fee per trade, derivatives-led.
  • Same discipline, zero debt, full corporate cash tax, self-funded growth.
  • Only difference, time.

Zerodha is what happens when this model compounds for a decade. The model is solved. Only time separates them.

Where the Numbers Rhyme

Two brokers in the same regulatory regime can run wildly different P&Ls. Dhan and Zerodha don't.

Net margin (PAT / revenue)

Dhan

46.6%

₹408 Cr profit on ₹877 Cr revenue

Zerodha

48.0%

₹4,232 Cr profit on ₹8,810 Cr revenue

The gap: Both close to half. The unit economics of the flat-fee discount-broking model are essentially identical.

Cash tax paid (full corporate rate)

Dhan

~₹140 Cr

28% of profit; full Indian corporate rate

Zerodha

~₹1,400 Cr

33% of profit; full Indian corporate rate

The gap: Neither has a tax shield. Both report real, taxable profit and pay it in cash.

Capital structure

Dhan

Zero borrowings

self-funded from operating cash

Zerodha

Zero borrowings

self-funded for over a decade

The gap: Identical. Both refuse leverage; both grow from operations.

The operating model has converged. The unit economics are not contested between the two; only execution and acquisition speed are.

The core insight

Dhan and Zerodha disagree on nothing structural. The audits read like the same business at different points on the curve.

Where the Numbers Diverge

The differences are scale and trajectory.

Revenue scale

Dhan

₹877 Cr

FY2025 standalone

Zerodha

₹8,810 Cr

FY2025 standalone

The gap: Zerodha is 10× the size. But the unit economics underneath are the same.

Revenue growth (YoY)

Dhan

+136%

fastest growth in the listed/audited broker cohort

Zerodha

Low-teens

now the market; growing in line with the category

The gap: Dhan is taking share. Zerodha is the category.

Advertising intensity

Dhan

₹74 Cr

+168% YoY; buying acquisition

Zerodha

Negligible

referral-led; earns acquisition

The gap: Same product. Different acquisition strategy. Dhan pays for users; Zerodha doesn't have to anymore.

Liquid asset cushion (treasury / cash)

Dhan

~₹163 Cr

year-end FY2025

Zerodha

Multi-thousand crore

decades of compounded retained earnings

The gap: Cushion size funds optionality (research, asset management, fund products). This is where Zerodha's lead extends beyond brokerage.

The Common Risk

A flat-fee broker is a leveraged bet on retail derivatives volume.

This is what makes the comparison interesting: their fates are correlated. Either both compound, or both compress.

What Each Has That the Other Doesn't

The structural advantages cut both ways.

The advantages that don't transfer

Dhan's edge

Enters a settled category.

In 2010, Zerodha had to educate retail traders on what flat-fee discount broking even meant. Demat penetration was under 5% of households. In 2021, Dhan entered a market where the model is no longer in question. Acquisition cost is higher (everyone competes for the same trader), but product education is done. A ₹2,500-4,000 Cr revenue base at the same margins is structurally available; FY2025 is on that curve.

Zerodha's edge

A decade of cohort depth.

Zerodha has compounded the same demat customers for over a decade. Those customers graduate: cash equity → derivatives → mutual funds (Coin) → bonds → wealth management. Each transition keeps them on the platform. The revenue line has shock-absorbers. Dhan's revenue mix is more concentrated in the cyclical F&O product, a regulatory shock hits Dhan harder.

Dhan has the unproven-category problem solved. Zerodha has the multi-product retention that comes only with time. Neither can copy the other.

The Read

This isn't competition. It's a timeline.

Dhan

A smaller Zerodha on the same audited math.

Zerodha

What this model produces after twelve years of cohort compounding.

Same margin. Same discipline. Same playbook. Different points on the same curve.

The model is solved. Only time separates them.

UnpopularVoice editorial read

Read Each Audit

The full filing-by-filing breakdown for each company is in the individual articles, with all sources and the audited line items they each surface.

More comparisons

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Wealth, fixed-income and investment-platform fintechs

WintWealth's Loan Book Grew ₹172 Cr. Dezerv Spent ₹111 Cr on Salaries. Stable Money Kept ₹3.58 Cr of ₹104 Cr.

Three Indian fintechs in broadly the wealth, fixed-income and investment-platform category. The FY2025 audits show three structurally different shapes. WintWealth operates an online bond platform alongside an embedded lending entity; its consolidated loan book expanded ₹172 Cr in FY25, broadly matching the year's operating cash absorption. Dezerv operates an HNI-focused wealth-advisory platform; ₹111 Cr of employee benefits in FY25 ran 1.7x revenue, reflecting an advisory-delivery model where senior bankers and relationship managers are the product. Stable Money operates a fixed-income distribution platform; ₹104 Cr of reported revenue at consolidated level translates to ₹3.58 Cr of standalone retained income, an implied retained-income ratio on reported gross revenue of approximately 0.34%. The three entities cannot be compared on cost-to-income because each reports revenue on a structurally different basis.

Co-branded credit-card fintechs

OneCard Spent ₹116 to Earn ₹100. Scapia Spent ₹305. Kiwi Spent ₹766.

Three Indian fintechs operating co-branded credit cards in partnership with issuing banks. The FY2025 audits show the same broad co-branded credit-card category at three different scale points. Kiwi at ₹3.83 Cr revenue reported ₹7.66 of cost per ₹1 of income. Scapia at ₹40.42 Cr reported ₹3.05. OneCard at ₹1,877.75 Cr reported ₹1.16. The reported cost-per-rupee-earned compresses with scale across these filings, though exact comparability depends on revenue recognition and bank-partner share treatment. Each entity has product differences (Kiwi is UPI-on-credit-card; Scapia is travel-led; OneCard is general-purpose) and the bank-partner revenue share is disclosed explicitly only at OneCard.

All numbers are from the most recent audited annual financial statements at the legal entity that operates each brand. Where a company operates through both a parent and a subsidiary, the underlying article specifies which entity the numbers cover. Full methodology →