Dezerv Was Near Breakeven in FY2023. In FY2025, It Lost ₹111.90 Cr.

The Company That Was Almost There

Two years before losing ₹111.90 Cr, Dezerv posted a loss of ₹4.71 Cr.

That was FY2023. Revenue was ₹52.58 Cr. Total expenses were ₹58.40 Cr. The gap between what the company earned and what it spent was ₹5.34 Cr — or 9 paise on every rupee of income. In the world of venture-backed fintech, that is as close to breakeven as it gets without crossing.

Then the trajectory reversed.

Revenue fell 62% in FY2024 to ₹20.06 Cr. Expenses stayed elevated at ₹65.72 Cr. The loss widened to ₹44.76 Cr. In FY2025, revenue partially recovered to ₹34.60 Cr — but expenses tripled to ₹150.10 Cr. Employee costs alone hit ₹92.60 Cr. The cost-to-income ratio moved from 3.13x to 3.93x.

The direction of travel here is not what a typical startup trajectory looks like.

More in this series: Jar FY2025 — first-ever profit on ₹188.78 Cr revenue · Scapia FY2025 — losses narrowed · Stable Money FY2025 — ₹104 Cr revenue, ₹44.9 Cr lost · Super Money FY2025 — ₹93.97 Cr earned, ₹147.81 Cr lost

Four Years, Four Very Different Stories

FY2023 stands out. Revenue crossed ₹52 Cr — extraordinary for a company in its second full year of operations — and the gap to breakeven was less than ₹5 Cr. The subsequent three years have moved further away from that point, not closer.

What Happened in FY2024

Revenue fell from ₹52.58 Cr to ₹20.06 Cr — a ₹32 Cr decline in a single year. The filing data does not state why.

Several factors could explain a collapse of this scale in a wealth management platform:

Regulatory shift: SEBI's 2023 changes to mutual fund distributor expense ratios reduced trail commissions industry-wide. If a meaningful portion of Dezerv's FY2023 revenue came from MF distribution commissions, the regulatory reset would have directly impacted the top line.

Business model pivot: Shifting from distribution (high-volume, commission-based) to advisory or PMS (fee-based, relationship-intensive) creates a revenue gap during transition. Distribution generates upfront or recurring commissions; PMS management fees accumulate with AUM over time.

AUM concentration: Wealth management revenue can be concentrated. Loss of a few large client relationships or mandates could create a disproportionate revenue impact.

None of these are confirmed by the filing. The available data shows the revenue number dropped sharply. The cause is not in the documents extracted.

The FY2025 Employee Cost Surge

Revenue in FY2025 recovered to ₹34.60 Cr — a 72% increase from ₹20.06 Cr. That is a meaningful rebound. But total expenses tripled in the same period, with employee costs as the primary driver.

Employee costs went from ₹38.77 Cr (FY2024) to ₹92.60 Cr (FY2025) — an increase of ₹53.83 Cr, or 139%. The filing does not break down whether this reflects new headcount, compensation resets, ESOP charges, variable pay accruals, or some combination. A 139% increase in employee costs is significant enough that it likely reflects hiring expansion and/or compensation buildout — but the precise composition is not in the available data.

The pattern is consistent with a wealth management company investing in relationship capacity ahead of AUM. PMS and discretionary mandates are people-intensive — a portfolio manager or relationship manager must be hired before the client AUM (and the fee income it generates) arrives. If the FY2025 cost expansion produces AUM at a revenue multiple that justifies the hire, the cost base may look different in retrospect.

Whether that conversion has happened is not in the filing data. AUM figures — the primary metric by which wealth management platforms are judged — are not required disclosures in MCA filings and were not available in the documents extracted for this article.

The Consolidated Picture and What the Subsidiaries Add

Dezerv's consolidated FY2025 numbers: ₹65.62 Cr revenue from operations, ₹66.01 Cr total income, ₹177.99 Cr total expenses, −₹111.98 Cr net loss.

The subsidiaries — Dezerv Securities Private Limited (brokerage) and Dezerv Distribution Services Private Limited (distribution) — together added approximately ₹31 Cr in revenue against an incremental loss of approximately ₹0.08 Cr.

The near-zero incremental loss from subsidiaries despite ₹31 Cr in additional revenue suggests those entities are operating close to or at breakeven. Dezerv Distribution's trail commission income and Dezerv Securities' brokerage revenues appear to cover their own operating costs at FY2025 run rates, with minimal drag on the consolidated result.

This is meaningful. The subsidiaries are not a hidden loss driver. The ₹111.90 Cr standalone loss is the core company's investment in people and infrastructure, not subsidiary burn.

The Three Founders and What They Disclosed

Dezerv was founded by three former IIFL Wealth executives who collectively managed significant client wealth before starting the company.

Sandeep Mohan Jethwani (DIN 07984864) — disclosed salary ₹96.92 Lakhs. Holds 39,735 equity shares directly.

Vaibhav Dungarsingh Porwal (DIN 09168435) — disclosed salary ₹86.92 Lakhs. Holds 33,212 equity shares.

Sahil Shabbir Contractor (DIN 08904463) — disclosed salary ₹77.50 Lakhs. Holds 22,553 equity shares.

The salary figures are in the range of senior professional compensation, not founder-minimal. In a company losing ₹111.90 Cr annually, founder salaries in the ₹77–97 Lakh range are not unusual for a Series-B stage startup with institutional investors — but they are part of the ₹92.60 Cr employee cost line. The three combined contribute approximately ₹2.61 Cr to that total.

Key institutional shareholders from the filing: Elevation Capital VII Limited (Series A and Seed CCPS), Matrix Partners India Investments III LLC, and Whiteboard Capital Fund-1.

Employer Score

Scores (1–5) weigh business model durability, loss trajectory and capital position, revenue growth signals, and available data from the filing. Employee Costs score reflects the 139% YoY increase — strong pay signals, but in the context of a company whose loss widened sharply. The increase in employee costs may reflect new hires, pay hikes, or both; the filing does not separate headcount from per-employee compensation.

Predictions

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On X:

Dezerv lost ₹4.71 Cr in FY2023 on ₹52.58 Cr revenue — 9 paise from breakeven. In FY2025, it lost ₹111.90 Cr on ₹34.60 Cr revenue. Employee costs: ₹92.60 Cr. We read the actual RoC filing.

On Reddit / communities:

Dezerv's FY2025 filing shows a company whose cost-to-income ratio is getting worse, not better — 1.10x in FY2023 (near breakeven), 3.13x in FY2024, 3.93x in FY2025. Employee costs are 2.68x standalone revenue. The FY2023 data shows the model can generate near-breakeven revenues. What happened since is a more complicated story. Full read in the article.

For LinkedIn:

In FY2023, Dezerv Investments was ₹4.71 Cr from breakeven on ₹52.58 Cr revenue. The cost-to-income ratio was 1.10x. Two years later: 3.93x, ₹111.90 Cr loss, employee costs of ₹92.60 Cr on ₹34.60 Cr revenue. The financials are from the actual MCA filing. The question they raise is not whether the model works — FY2023 showed it can. The question is whether the FY2025 cost expansion will convert to AUM and revenue fast enough.

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A Note on This Data

The financial figures in this article come from annual statements filed by Dezerv Investments Private Limited with the Registrar of Companies under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs — public documents accessible to any Indian citizen under the Companies Act, 2013.

FY2025 standalone figures come from a PAS-3 valuation report filed in October 2025 as part of a capital allotment record. These are management-prepared financials used in a valuation context — near-final but not extracted from the audited XBRL attachment. The FY2025 audited consolidated figures come from the MCA XBRL HTML viewer and are audited. FY2024 and FY2023 standalone figures come from fully audited financial statements attached to the AOC-4 filings.

All figures are as disclosed in the relevant filings. Minor rounding applies. This article is for informational purposes only — it is not investment advice, not a recommendation to buy or sell any security, and not a report of any SEBI-registered research analyst. UnpopularVoice is an independent publication.