Kissht FY2025: Revenue ₹306 Cr (-26%), PAT ₹51 Cr | Profitable Fintech, Shrinking Business

The Number That Needs Context

Kissht grew revenue 59% in FY2024, from ₹258.88 Cr to ₹412.03 Cr. It was one of the best fintech revenue years in the company's history. PAT tripled.

Then in FY2025, revenue fell 26% back to ₹306.18 Cr.

That is still higher than FY2023. The company is still profitable. But the arc matters: rapid build, sharp pullback, and an explanation that the filing does not provide.

Krishnan Vishwanathan's Thesis

Krishnan Vishwanathan co-founded Kissht in 2016, the same year Paytm was expanding aggressively on UPI and ZestMoney was just getting started. The thesis was precise: middle India buys a ₹15,000 phone or a ₹20,000 washing machine but cannot access a bank loan. The existing system required credit history Kissht's target customer did not have.

The solution was a digital NBFC infrastructure at the point of sale. Kissht integrated with electronics retailers, online platforms, and kirana networks to offer real-time EMI credit, not pre-approved cards but instant credit decisions at the moment of purchase. The proprietary credit model used alternative data to assess borrowers that formal credit bureaus would reject.

Ranvir Singh joined as co-director. The structure they built, with OnEMI Technology Solutions as the technology/platform entity and Si Creva Capital Services as the NBFC that actually disbursed loans, was deliberate. It separated IP and platform risk from balance sheet lending risk.

By FY2024, that thesis had produced ₹82.47 Cr in profit. By FY2025, it was still producing ₹50.90 Cr. In Indian consumer fintech, that is unusual enough to deserve closer scrutiny.

Three Years, Three Stories

Metric	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue from Operations	₹258.88 Cr	₹412.03 Cr	₹306.18 Cr
PAT	₹24.68 Cr	₹82.47 Cr	₹50.90 Cr
PBT	₹26.44 Cr	₹111.19 Cr	~₹68 Cr (est.)
Employee Costs	₹87.79 Cr	₹117.00 Cr	not disclosed standalone
Net Worth	₹554.09 Cr	₹671.82 Cr	₹764.36 Cr
Cash	₹230.67 Cr	₹120.50 Cr	not in XBRL yet

The pattern: FY2023 was the recovery year after regulatory disruption. FY2024 was the breakout. FY2025 was the correction.

Revenue growth in FY2024 was 59%. Revenue decline in FY2025 was 26%. The company emerged from FY2025 with a higher net worth than FY2024, which means equity was added even as earnings fell.

The Structure: Why Parent Revenue Fell

In simple terms: Kissht the app and brand belongs to OnEMI Technology Solutions. The actual loans are made by a separate subsidiary (Si Creva Capital). OnEMI earns technology fees from that subsidiary. When the subsidiary lends more, OnEMI earns more. When it lends less, OnEMI earns less. The FY2025 revenue decline in the filing reflects this mechanic directly.

OnEMI is not the lender. Si Creva Capital Services Private Limited (the 100% subsidiary) is the registered NBFC that disburses loans, holds the loan book, and carries the credit risk. OnEMI earns fees for providing technology services: the credit scoring platform, the origination interface, the collections infrastructure.

When the NBFC subsidiary disburses more loans, the technology fee income of OnEMI rises. When disbursements slow, OnEMI's revenue drops even if the standalone balance sheet is unaffected.

This separation shows up clearly in the FY2024 XBRL data:

• Standalone total income: ₹4,289.28 Mn (₹428.93 Cr)
• Consolidated total income: ₹12,952.41 Mn (₹1,295.24 Cr)
• Consolidated PAT: ₹1,238.35 Mn (₹123.84 Cr)

The consolidated entity was more than 3x larger than the standalone parent. Si Creva Capital, operating as the NBFC, was doing the bulk of the revenue and profit generation at the group level.

The FY2025 standalone revenue drop therefore likely reflects a slowdown in loan disbursements from the subsidiary, which would mechanically reduce the technology fee income that OnEMI recognises.

What Caused the Slowdown

The filing is silent on causes. Context is not.

RBI's digital lending guidelines (September 2022) fundamentally changed the operating model for fintech-NBFC partnerships. The most significant change: all loan disbursements and repayments must be made directly between the borrower and the NBFC, with no intermediary wallets. First-Loss Default Guarantees (FLDGs), fee arrangements where the tech partner compensates the NBFC for defaults, were capped at 5% of the loan portfolio (later revised to specific structures under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act).

These rules mattered to Kissht because they affected how Si Creva Capital and OnEMI structured their commercial relationship, how revenue was recognised, and how much lending risk the NBFC subsidiary could take while maintaining required capital adequacy.

The FLDG reset was specifically disruptive. Many fintech platforms had structured their income by providing FLDG guarantees to partner NBFCs, producing recognisable revenue on the tech company's books. When RBI clarified and restricted these structures, technology fee income recognised by parent entities like OnEMI was directly affected.

This is an inference, not stated in the filing. But the timing, FY2024 peak followed by FY2025 decline, aligns precisely with when these regulations were implemented and the industry recalibrated.

Balance Sheet: The Quiet Strength

What makes Kissht's FY2025 story different from most fintech revenue-decline stories is the balance sheet.

Zero debt at the standalone level. As of March 31, 2024 (the most recent XBRL standalone balance sheet available), OnEMI carried no borrowings, neither current nor non-current.

Net worth ₹764.36 Cr as of March 31, 2025 (from the MGT-7 annual return filed in August 2025). This is up from ₹671.82 Cr in FY2024 and ₹554.09 Cr in FY2023. The net worth growth outpaced the ₹50.90 Cr PAT contribution, implying additional equity was raised in FY2025.

Non-current investments ₹438.95 Cr in FY2024, largely capital advanced to or invested in Si Creva Capital to fund its NBFC balance sheet. The parent essentially functions as a capital holding and technology platform entity.

This structure means the parent company is insulated from the lending risk. Si Creva Capital bears the loan book defaults. OnEMI earns fees and holds equity in the subsidiary. A bad credit cycle hurts the subsidiary's net worth, not the parent's operating model.

The risk, conversely, is that if Si Creva's lending book contracts, OnEMI's fee income contracts with it, which is exactly what FY2025 showed.

The Conversion to "Limited"

One detail in the FY2025 filing stands out for what it implies.

Between FY2024 and FY2025, OnEMI Technology Solutions converted from a Private Limited to a Limited company. The MGT-7 shows the year-end status was "OnEMI Technology Solutions Private Limited" but the filing-date status is "OnEMI Technology Solutions Limited."

Converting from private to public (unlisted) under the Companies Act 2013 requires a special resolution, a minimum paid-up capital threshold, and is typically done either for compliance reasons or in anticipation of a public market event.

This conversion, quiet and undisclosed, buried in the MCA filing, is notable. Companies do not do this casually. It is not confirmation of an IPO plan. But it is a prerequisite for one.

What Must Happen Next

For Kissht to grow from ₹306 Cr back toward and beyond ₹412 Cr, several things need to move:

1. Si Creva Capital must resume disbursement growth. If the subsidiary's NBFC loan book stagnated or contracted in FY2025, OnEMI's technology fee income fell with it. Renewed disbursements, within RBI's revised FLDG and digital lending frameworks, would directly lift parent revenue.

2. The commercial structure between parent and subsidiary must be RBI-compliant and sustainable. The post-2022 regulatory environment requires that intercompany fee arrangements between fintech platforms and NBFC subsidiaries be clearly arm's length and documented. An aggressive fee structure that looked like a guarantee arrangement could attract scrutiny.

3. Margins must hold despite a smaller revenue base. In FY2024, with ₹117 Cr in employee costs and ₹183 Cr in other expenses on ₹412 Cr revenue, the PBT margin was 27%. In FY2025, if fixed costs are sticky, they become a larger fraction of a smaller revenue base, pressuring margins. The estimated ~22% PBT margin in FY2025 suggests some compression already.

4. Equity raises should be converted into subsidiary capital. The parent's net worth grew ₹92.54 Cr more than PAT would explain. That additional capital needs to flow into Si Creva's lending capacity to earn a return. Capital sitting in the parent generates no direct loan income.

5. The private-to-public company conversion should clarify its purpose. If this was preparatory for a public market raise, the company needs a clear growth story, which a consecutive year of revenue decline complicates.

Why the Shrink Could Be Strategic

Not every revenue decline is a warning sign. There is a credible bull case for what Kissht's FY2025 numbers might actually represent.

Credit quality tightening. Consumer NBFC lending carries meaningful default risk, particularly in the unsecured EMI and BNPL segments Kissht operates in. A deliberate reduction in disbursements could reflect management raising the credit bar: cutting riskier borrower segments, shrinking exposure to delinquency-prone products, and accepting lower volume in exchange for a cleaner loan book. If Si Creva Capital's NPA ratios improved in FY2025, the revenue decline would look different.

Regulatory alignment, not retreat. RBI's digital lending guidelines required structural changes that took 12-18 months to fully implement. The revenue impact in FY2025 may reflect a one-time compliance recalibration, a reset from which growth can restart on a more durable regulatory foundation. Companies that absorbed the friction early are better positioned than those that resisted.

Shifting to higher-margin business. Technology fee structures in NBFC-fintech partnerships have been evolving. A lower disbursement volume paired with a higher fee per rupee disbursed, or a shift toward co-lending structures that carry better economics, could explain margin compression (from 27% PBT in FY2024 to ~22% in FY2025) without indicating structural deterioration.

Balance sheet strength as optionality. Zero debt, ₹764 Cr net worth, and consistent profitability give Kissht the balance sheet to absorb a slow year without existential pressure. Companies that shrink voluntarily and survive profitably are in a fundamentally different position from companies that shrink because they have no choice.

The filing doesn't confirm any of these. But the financial structure (profitable, debt-free, net worth growing) is consistent with a company managing a deliberate transition, not one in distress.

The Company Most People Haven't Analysed

Kissht is not a loss-making startup burning VC money. It has not been loss-making since FY2023. It has zero debt at the parent level. Its net worth has grown every year for four years.

It is also, in FY2025, a company that shrank by a meaningful 26%, without explaining why in its public filings.

That combination is unusual enough to deserve closer scrutiny. Most companies in this space are either growing and losing money, or shrinking and in distress. Kissht is shrinking and profitable. The filing invites the reader to decide whether that is discipline or deceleration.