BigBasket's App Alone Lost ₹1,851 Cr in FY25. It Spent ₹497 Cr on Ads.
BigBasket revenue, PAT, debt and cash flow, from the FY25 standalone audit for Innovative Retail Concepts Private Limited (IRCPL), the entity that operates the BigBasket consumer app and BB Daily subscription. FY24 and FY23 comparatives from the entity's prior-year audits..
The BigBasket consumer app spent 51% more on advertising in FY25 than the year before.
The revenue it bought fell.
That is the summary line in the FY25 audit for Innovative Retail Concepts Pvt Ltd, the legal entity behind bigbasket.com and the BB Daily subscription.
The core insight
FY25: revenue fell 3%. Advertising rose 51%. Loss widened 46% to the widest reading on record. That is the arithmetic of a business trying to buy back the shoppers it used to have.
Three lines in the audit tell you what happened. Read in order, they connect the dots.
Line 1: Revenue from operations, ₹7,673.4 Cr
Down about 3% from ₹7,884.5 Cr in FY24. In IRCPL's full history on the public register, this is the first year the top line moved backwards. FY24 had already been the slowest growth year in the history of the entity, at 6%. FY25 turned it negative.
The number matters because the BigBasket app has been Indian online grocery's foundational player for a decade. Category share it once had unchallenged is now being taken by ten-minute delivery. The audit does not label a cause. It records the outcome.
Line 2: Net loss, ₹1,851 Cr
Up 46% from ₹1,267 Cr in FY24. FY24 had itself been an improvement, with loss down 17% versus the ₹1,535 Cr posted in FY23. That improvement is now reversed and then some. The FY25 loss is the widest on IRCPL's own record. Not the widest for FY23. Not the widest for FY24. The widest full stop.
If you were reading BigBasket at the FY24 audit, you would have concluded the loss trend was under management. If you read the FY25 audit, that conclusion has to be unwound.
Line 3: Advertising and marketing, ₹496.8 Cr
Up 51% from ₹330 Cr in FY24. On a revenue base that fell, this is the line that moved most in the opposite direction.
Advertising intensity, ad spend as a share of revenue, moved from 4.2% to 6.5% in a single year. That is a big single-year move for an entity of IRCPL's scale. The direction of it, more ad spend in a year of revenue decline, is the mechanism that connects the first two lines.
Read together, the audit tells you what BigBasket tried
Revenue that falls, loss that widens, and advertising that rises faster than either of the other two, are not three independent movements. They are one movement.
The consumer-behaviour shift in Indian online grocery in FY24 and FY25 pushed a meaningful share of the scheduled-delivery basket toward ten-minute delivery. The three quick-commerce players grew their combined weekly order counts through both years. IRCPL, whose scheduled-delivery model is the original BigBasket, saw revenue growth flatten in FY24 and then reverse in FY25.
The ₹497 Cr ad line is what a business does when the loss of category share is real. You spend more per retained customer, more per re-acquired customer, more on offers to the ones at risk of leaving. You do that even though the revenue you buy costs more per rupee than in either of the last two years. The audit records the trade. It does not record whether the trade worked.
What the audit also tells you: no debt has been added
For most companies of IRCPL's scale that print widening losses on falling revenue, the immediate next line to check is borrowings. Distress usually shows up as new working-capital lines, new NBFC facilities, new bank credit against receivables.
For IRCPL, none of that appears on the register.
The charges register carries three secured facilities on record. A ₹45 Cr private-lender facility from March 2017. A ₹25 Cr private-lender facility from December 2017. A ₹5 Cr HDFC Bank facility from October 2021. All three are marked satisfied. Zero active. The most recent registered secured facility was retired before FY24 even opened. Through the entire FY25 loss cycle, no new secured lender relationship was granted to IRCPL.
The absorption of the FY25 loss happened through the paid-up capital base, which stands at ₹2,859.34 Cr as of the last balance sheet on record. That is roughly 1.5 years of FY25-level loss sitting on IRCPL's own balance sheet as equity from Tata Digital. It is what makes the FY25 loss trajectory sustainable in the immediate term, even though the operating trajectory it describes is not.
The two things the FY25 audit does not tell you
The first is what is happening at the sister entity. Supermarket Grocery Supplies Pvt Ltd, the B2B and supplies engine, filed its own FY25 audit on 4 August 2025. That audit has its own P&L, and it shows revenue also falling and loss also widening. Reading BigBasket only through IRCPL misses that entire engine.
The second is what happens next. FY26 disclosure at IRCPL will be filed roughly a year from now. Whether the ₹497 Cr advertising bet held retention, or whether the two-line movement (falling revenue, widening loss) continues, will be visible in that audit and only in that audit. The BigBasket app is currently mid-turnaround. The audit's job is to record where it lands.
About the author
Contributor, UnpopularVoice
Anjali M. covers Indian consumer, retail, and quick commerce for UnpopularVoice. She reads the annual returns first and asks the second question later.
More from Quick Commerce
Other audited teardowns in the same sector
BigBasket
BigBasket Lost ₹3,857 Cr Last Year. It Has Zero Bank Debt.
4 min read
BigBasket
There Are Two BigBaskets. Both Just Had Their Worst Year.
6 min read
Swish
Swish Earned ₹4 Cr. Spent ₹23 Cr. Sits on ₹119 Cr Cash.
7 min read
Zepto
Zepto Doubled Revenue. Losses Barely Moved. That's the Point.
10 min read