There Are Two BigBaskets. Both Just Had Their Worst Year.

You order groceries from BigBasket.

There is no single company called BigBasket.

The brand is a customer-facing surface. The business runs on two separate private limited companies, both incorporated in Karnataka, both wholly held by Tata Digital, and each filing its own audited P&L every year.

One of them lost ₹1,851 Cr in FY25. The other one lost ₹2,007 Cr. Neither of them is called BigBasket.

Both entities file. Both filed FY25. Both filed on time.

Under Indian company law, private limited companies must file their annual audited financial statements within thirty days of their annual general meeting. Both BigBasket entities do that, on cadence, every year.

The point of reading the two together is not that one has disappeared. It is that the two entities' P&Ls describe different pieces of the same brand, and no single audited number captures BigBasket as a business. What the group's investors see in Tata Digital's consolidated report is a single figure. What the two standalone audits show, one at a time, is the two operating engines behind that figure.

FY25 was the worst year for both entities

In FY25, the two entities moved in the same direction at the same time. Revenue fell at both. Loss widened at both. And each entity delivered its widest loss ever in its own filed history.

IRCPL revenue fell 3% and loss widened 46%. SGS revenue fell 2% and loss widened 42%. The two figures are not just directionally the same. The rate of loss expansion is almost identical.

What the two-entity structure means for reading the numbers

Adding the two standalone P&Ls gives approximately ₹17,540 Cr in reported FY25 revenue and around ₹3,857 Cr in reported FY25 loss.

That combined total is not what BigBasket the group actually earned from external customers. SGS's revenue includes the inventory it supplies to IRCPL, and IRCPL's revenue includes the consumer sales of goods it bought from SGS. When you add the two P&Ls, some of the revenue and the corresponding cost is counted twice.

Only the consolidated view, reported at the Tata Digital or Tata Sons level, eliminates that intercompany overlap. What the two standalone audits let you do is see the shape of each operating engine separately: how much is the B2C app growing (or shrinking), and how much is the wholesale-and-supplies layer.

In FY25, the answer at both engines is the same. Shrinking on the top line, widening on the loss line.

The debt profile is where the Tata Digital funding model is visible

For most Indian consumer companies that print widening losses on falling revenue, the immediate next question is the balance sheet, and specifically the debt on the register. In FY25, if a company's losses widen materially, you would usually see new borrowing granted against its receivables, its inventory, or its assets.

For BigBasket, none of that happens across either entity.

The combined charges register across IRCPL and SGS carries five secured facilities on record: two private-lender facilities registered against IRCPL in 2017, one private-lender facility registered against SGS in 2017, one larger private-lender facility registered against SGS in 2019, and one small HDFC Bank facility registered against IRCPL in October 2021. Total historical registered principal: ₹210 Cr. All five are marked satisfied.

Zero active secured facilities sit on either entity today. Through the FY23-to-FY25 loss cycle, no new secured lender relationship was established against either BigBasket entity, and no existing facility was expanded. The mechanism that has absorbed the losses is Tata Digital's equity, deployed directly onto the paid-up capital lines of the two operating entities. IRCPL alone carries ₹2,859.34 Cr of paid-up capital.

The read the two audits give you

Reading BigBasket by looking at only IRCPL misses the B2B engine entirely. Reading it by looking at only SGS misses the consumer arm. Adding the two double-counts the goods that move between them.

The genuine forensic read of BigBasket in FY25 is that both operating entities file, both stayed current, and both had their worst year on the standalone P&L. Revenue moved backwards at both. Loss widened at both. The equity base at the parent absorbed the shortfall at both. No secured debt was granted or drawn against either.

Everything above is on the public record. The audits landed. The numbers are the numbers. The structure is the story most readers do not see.