Flipkart's App Cut Losses 37%. Marketplace Fees Doubled.

The Flipkart app grew revenue 14% in FY25.

Its net loss fell 37%.

That is the summary line in the FY25 audit for Flipkart Internet Private Limited, the legal entity behind the Flipkart consumer marketplace.

Three lines in the audit tell you what happened. Read in order, they connect the dots.

Line 1: Revenue from operations, ₹20,493 Cr

Up 14.4% from ₹17,907 Cr in FY24. The consolidated figure, matching what the audit's P&L records.

But the composition is more interesting than the headline. The mix inside the audit's revenue note tells a different story than the top-line number.

Marketplace services, the commission Flipkart charges sellers on transactions, more than doubled. Advertising revenue, which Flipkart earns from seller-funded promotion inside the app, grew 27%. Those are the two highest-margin lines in the mix.

Logistics income fell 38%. The structural reason is that Ekart, the Flipkart logistics arm, now carries more of that revenue line in its own separately filed entity. The marketplace still earns the economics but no longer books all of the shipping fees as its own revenue.

Line 2: Net loss, ₹1,494 Cr

Down 37% from ₹2,359 Cr in FY24. The sharpest single-year loss compression in the entity's recent history.

The standalone number is slightly larger (loss narrowed 32% from ₹2,296 Cr to ₹1,569 Cr). The ₹75 Cr gap between standalone and consolidated reflects the share of profit from subsidiaries and associates, which has grown modestly.

What matters is the direction and the magnitude. The loss did not narrow because of a one-time gain or a tax credit. It narrowed because the operating expense base moved in a specific way.

Line 3: Employee benefit expense, ₹4,748 Cr

Down 8.3% from ₹5,178 Cr in FY24. On a revenue base that grew 14.4%.

That is the single most important movement in the P&L. For a marketplace entity, employee cost is one of the largest controllable expense lines. Cutting it by ₹430 Cr while scaling revenue by ₹2,586 Cr produces operating leverage that compounds through the P&L.

Depreciation also declined, from ₹317 Cr to ₹256 Cr. Finance costs declined marginally from ₹175 Cr to ₹162 Cr. Other expenses rose from ₹14,958 Cr to ₹17,145 Cr, broadly in line with revenue growth. Advertising and promotional spend specifically within other expenses jumped 37% from ₹2,996 Cr to ₹4,100 Cr.

Read together, the audit tells you how the loss compressed

Revenue grew 14%. Employee cost fell 8%. Depreciation fell 19%. Finance cost fell. Advertising rose 37%, more than offsetting the mix shift benefit from marketplace commission. But the overall expense base grew only 8%, well below the 14% revenue growth. That gap is the loss narrowing.

The audit records the operating lever: for the first time in recent years, the Flipkart app grew revenue faster than its cost base. That is the arithmetic of a marketplace approaching reported accounting break-even.

What the audit also shows: how the loss is funded

For a marketplace entity of Flipkart's scale, the next line to check is the balance sheet. Where did the FY25 loss cushion come from, and what is the debt profile?

The audit note on share capital and reserves records a rights issue during FY25 of ₹3,249 Cr. The counterparties: Flipkart Marketplace Private Limited and Flipkart Private Limited, both Singapore-incorporated, both ultimately held by Walmart Inc. This is Walmart equity flowing into the India operating entity.

The audit also records demand loans taken during FY25 from Flipkart India Private Limited (the fellow subsidiary and B2B wholesale layer) of ₹24,753 Cr, of which ₹24,133 Cr was repaid within the year. The intercompany flow is large, but the net outstanding at year-end is modest. The structural point is that the wholesale entity funds working capital for the marketplace entity on a rolling basis.

External secured debt against Flipkart Internet is largely absent through this cycle. The ₹162 Cr of finance cost in FY25 includes intercompany interest paid to Flipkart India (₹120 Cr noted explicitly in the cash flow decomposition), lease liability interest, and some working-capital charges. No new scheduled bank facility was taken against the entity during the FY23-FY25 loss cycle.

The two things the audit does not tell you

The first is what is happening at the sister entity. Flipkart India Private Limited, the B2B wholesale engine, filed its own FY25 audit with S.R. Batliboi & Associates LLP. That audit has its own P&L, with revenue of ₹82,787 Cr (up 17%) and a loss of ₹5,189 Cr (widened 22%). Reading Flipkart only through Flipkart Internet misses the entire inventory layer that supplies the marketplace.

The second is what happens next. The audit's post-year-end notes record three material items after 31 March 2025: a composite Scheme of Arrangement lodged with the NCLT and the Singapore High Court on 22 May 2025 (covering eight group entities), a further rights issue of 24.7 million Class A shares, and a 101:1 bonus share split. The NCLT sanctioned the scheme in December 2025. The reverse flip from Singapore to India completed in March 2026. Flipkart Internet is now the principal holding company for the entire Flipkart group in India, ahead of a planned Indian IPO.

The FY25 audit is the last filed snapshot of the entity in its pre-flip form. The next audit will look different: Flipkart Internet will consolidate the entities that used to sit above it in the Singapore holding chain, and the per-share arithmetic will have reset.

What the FY25 audit records clearly, however, is the operational direction. Revenue grew. Costs were disciplined. Loss narrowed sharply. The marketplace is closer to break-even than it has ever been. That part of the story will carry forward into the next audit regardless of how the group architecture has moved around it.