How the Good Glamm Group Ran Out of Money

The Good Glamm Group ran out of money in the two years between September 2023 and September 2025.

The trajectory is in the filings. Eight brands acquired in a single financial year. ₹1,730 Cr raised in that same year to fund the acquisitions. Consolidated losses of ₹917 Cr in FY23. Then silence: no audited FY24 accounts, no FY25 annual return, no board meetings recorded in public records for two years.

Then, on 26 September 2025, the National Company Law Tribunal issued the first order placing Sanghvi Beauty & Technologies Private Limited under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the formal insolvency procedure under India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. A second tribunal order followed on 8 December 2025. On 12 January 2026, the statutory auditor filed a formal resignation notice.

This is the story the audit tells about how the money was raised, how it was spent, and why it ran out.

What did the business look like before it became an aggregator?

For five years between FY2016 and FY2020, the entity that would later become The Good Glamm Group operated as a single-brand direct-to-consumer beauty business. The original legal name, per annual return, was Sanghvi Technologies Private Limited: a Pune-incorporated private company with modest capital and a single business activity.

Revenue crawled. ₹3.1 Cr in FY16. ₹13.8 Cr in FY17. Then it fell to ₹10 Cr in FY18. ₹14 Cr in FY19. Not a growth story anyone would look at twice.

Losses were steady in the ₹10-37 Cr range across the same five years. Not enormous, but persistent. Every year the company lost money and needed fresh equity to continue. Net worth stayed under ₹50 Cr in all five years.

Employee benefit expense grew from ₹2.8 Cr in FY16 to ₹19.8 Cr in FY20. The team was expanding faster than the revenue.

And crucially, across all five of those years, the annual return records the same number in the subsidiaries schedule: zero. Sanghvi Technologies had no subsidiaries. It was a single brand: MyGlamm.

The consolidated financial statements do not exist for FY16 through FY21, because there was nothing to consolidate.

When did the aggregator strategy actually begin?

In FY22 the story changes completely.

The annual return for the year ending March 2022 records eight subsidiaries where a year earlier there had been zero. In the same year, the company's balance sheet transforms:

• Total assets went from ₹215 Cr (FY21 close) to ₹1,817 Cr (FY22 close). An 8.4x jump.
• Non-current investments went from ₹12 Cr to ₹724 Cr. That is the value of the acquired subsidiaries sitting on the balance sheet.
• Cash and cash equivalents grew. Working capital ballooned. Trade payables expanded.

The annual cash flow statement for FY22 tells you where the money moved and how much:

• Financing activities net inflow: ₹1,730 Cr. This is what the entity raised in FY22 through fresh equity and debt.
• Investing activities net outflow: -₹1,230 Cr. This is what left the door as consideration for the acquired subsidiaries and related items.

The remaining ₹500 Cr of the raise funded operating losses (₹303 Cr consumed by operations that year, per the operating cash flow (OCF) line) and working-capital build.

The eight subsidiaries acquired in FY22, as recorded in the annual return, were: LUXEVA India (100%), INFOMOKO Technology (100%, subsequently amalgamated into the parent), ST BOTANICA Beauty, AMISHI Consumer Technologies (81%, the parent of POPxo Beauty), SIRONA Hygiene (51%), SCOOPWHOOP Media (100%), SYSCOM Organic World (51%, the parent of The Moms Co), and Sanghvi Beauty & Technologies International PTE Ltd (100%, a Singapore-registered international arm).

The brand portfolio the world knew as The Good Glamm Group was assembled in twelve months.

What did FY23 look like inside the group?

FY23 is the last full year of financial disclosure before the silence. It is also the year the aggregator model broke.

The consolidated revenue reached ₹603 Cr, up 2.5 times from FY22's ₹240 Cr. The acquired brands were being consolidated for their first full year. On the top line, the strategy looked like it was working: the group was now a ~₹600 Cr business, larger than any single Indian D2C beauty company had been at that stage.

The cost side was different.

Employee benefit expense at the consolidated level moved from ₹146 Cr (FY22) to ₹420 Cr (FY23). Nearly a tripling. A group with 8 acquired brands, each with its own team, and a central corporate layer, does not scale headcount linearly. It scales it multiplicatively.

Other expenses moved from ₹240 Cr to ₹754 Cr. On a ₹603 Cr revenue base.

The standalone P&L makes one of these lines more visible. In FY23, at the parent-entity level, "Advertising and Promotional Expenses" was ₹232.16 Cr. Standalone revenue from operations in the same year was ₹242.24 Cr. The parent spent ₹0.96 in advertising for every ₹1 of revenue it earned.

The consolidated view does not disclose advertising separately at this granularity because the taxonomy schema at that time rolled advertising into other operating expenses at the group level. But the standalone figure alone tells the story: the aggregator was buying growth for the acquired brands using cash generated by nobody.

Consolidated loss for FY23: ₹917 Cr. Standalone loss: ₹532 Cr. The consolidated view is worse by ₹385 Cr. That means the subsidiaries, the acquired brands themselves, collectively contributed ₹385 Cr of additional loss beyond the parent's own operating shortfall.

Finance costs at the consolidated level in FY23 were ₹54 Cr. Depreciation and amortisation was ₹62 Cr. These are the fixed carrying costs of the debt taken on to fund the acquisitions and the amortisation of the intangibles booked on the consolidation. Neither goes away in a downturn.

At year end, consolidated cash was ₹145 Cr. Total borrowings were ₹379 Cr (current ₹254 Cr + non-current ₹126 Cr). Consolidated goodwill was ₹392 Cr, sitting on the balance sheet as a reminder of what had been paid for the brands. Other intangibles were ₹401 Cr, mostly trademarks and brand valuations from acquisition-price allocations.

Why did the FY24 audit never come?

Under Indian company law, a private limited company is required to file its annual accounts and annual return with the corporate registrar each year. For a March 31 fiscal-year close, the AGM is expected by September 30 of the same calendar year, and the annual filing within 30 days of that.

Sanghvi Beauty & Technologies held its last recorded AGM on 30 September 2023, the AGM that adopted the FY23 accounts. After that, the record goes silent for two full years. No annual filing for FY24. No annual return for FY24. No AGM notice for FY25.

Then, in the second half of 2025, three tribunal-related filings appear on the record.

The specific contents of the two tribunal orders are not surfaced by the filing metadata alone; the underlying orders themselves would be needed to identify the petitioning creditor, the admission date, the appointed Resolution Professional, and the case number. What the filings do establish is the timeline: the tribunal became involved in September 2025, the process was extended in December 2025, and the auditor exited in January 2026.

Once a corporate entity enters the insolvency process, section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code imposes a moratorium that suspends the board and hands operational control to a Resolution Professional. The mandatory obligation to hold AGMs and file annual accounts is affected in practice. That is why the FY24 audit never came, and why the FY25 annual return has not been filed.

The FY23 audit is therefore the last full disclosure of the business's operating economics before the insolvency window closed the ability to see inside.

What was the debt position at the last available snapshot?

At March 2023, the parent-level standalone balance sheet carried short-term borrowings of ₹243.7 Cr and long-term borrowings of ₹125.6 Cr. Total: ₹369.3 Cr.

The public charges register carries a longer trail. Fifteen entries in total. One satisfied in 2019. The other fourteen are still on the record, of which eleven are marked ACTIVE and three are MODIFIED but not retired. In aggregate, ₹594 Cr of registered secured facilities remain on the register.

Only ₹100 Cr of that is with institutional banks: HDFC ₹40 Cr (created November 2021), HSBC ₹50 Cr (created December 2022), and a second HSBC facility of ₹10 Cr (also December 2022). The remaining ₹494 Cr sits with holders the register labels as "Others", predominantly NBFCs and specialised lenders.

The pattern of when these facilities were created is the more revealing part. Six new secured charges were registered after 30 September 2023, the date of the last AGM. They total ₹202.77 Cr:

• ₹50 Cr, April 2023 (registered just before the last AGM)
• ₹15.01 Cr, April 2023
• ₹55 Cr, January 2024
• ₹25.25 Cr, January 2024
• ₹25.18 Cr, August 2024
• ₹32.33 Cr, March 2025 (the last charge before the September 2025 tribunal order)

In the twenty-nine months between the last full-year audit and the first tribunal order, the company was still originating fresh secured facilities. Whether that represents bridge financing, forbearance-driven security enhancement, or related-party lending is not disclosed at the register level. What is disclosed is the direction: not deleveraging.

The full charges register decomposition sits in the companion piece Good Glamm has ₹594 Cr of registered secured debt still active.

What can the FY23 audit tell us about why the model broke?

Three specific mechanics are visible in the numbers.

First, the acquired brands' economics did not turn on schedule. The gap between standalone loss (₹532 Cr) and consolidated loss (₹917 Cr) at FY23 is ₹385 Cr. That gap is the aggregate net contribution of the seven subsidiaries visible in that year's annual return. Every one of them, on average, added to the loss. This is common in the first eighteen months after an acquisition, expected, even, given integration costs. But it is not sustainable indefinitely without visible unit-economics improvement, which the FY23 audit does not disclose at brand level.

Second, the corporate cost base at the parent grew faster than the group's revenue. Standalone employee benefit expense at Sanghvi Beauty & Technologies (excluding the subsidiaries' payrolls) went from ₹110 Cr (FY22) to ₹322 Cr (FY23). This is the central-office cost of running the aggregator: the leadership team, the group corporate functions, the shared brand infrastructure, plus what appears to be substantial employee stock option plan (ESOP) charges based on the ₹177 Cr share-based-payment adjustment in the FY23 cash flow. The parent was building a group-level cost structure appropriate for a much larger business than the ₹603 Cr consolidated revenue actually justified.

Third, the marketing spend was extraordinary and it did not produce sustainable operating leverage. Standalone advertising and promotional expenses of ₹232.16 Cr on standalone revenue of ₹242.24 Cr is 96%. For a mature D2C brand, sub-15% advertising intensity is typical. For a scaling brand, 30-40% is high but justifiable. 96% is the number a business runs when it is trying to sustain visibility across a portfolio using a corporate marketing budget rather than brand-level economics. It is also the number that produces immediate cash outflow with an uncertain return.

Where does this leave the acquired brands?

The seven subsidiaries visible in the FY23 annual return are legally separate entities. Each has its own corporate identity number (CIN), its own directors, and its own audited financial statements. In a CIRP scenario at the holding-company level, the subsidiaries' fate depends on the structure of the resolution plan that eventually gets approved.

Three broad scenarios exist. A resolution plan can preserve the group intact under new ownership (a strategic acquirer takes over the entire aggregator). Or the plan can carve out the subsidiaries and sell them individually (each brand goes to a different acquirer). Or, if no plan is approved within the statutory 330-day window, liquidation follows and the subsidiaries are sold as individual assets to satisfy creditor claims.

Which of these plays out for The Good Glamm Group is not yet on the public record.

What is on the public record is the FY23 audit: the last full disclosure before the silence, showing an aggregator that raised ₹1,730 Cr in one year, deployed ₹1,230 Cr of it across eight acquisitions in the same year, then lost ₹917 Cr in the year after, then stopped filing.

Notes on the reporting

All financial figures in this article are extracted from audited financial statements filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs by Sanghvi Beauty & Technologies Private Limited, formerly Sanghvi Technologies Private Limited. Standalone data covers FY2016 through FY2023 continuously (8 years). Consolidated data covers FY2022 and FY2023 (the two years for which subsidiaries existed).

The annual return data on subsidiary composition, share capital, and shareholding pattern is drawn from the returns filed for the same period. The subsidiary list at FY23 close is drawn from the annual return filed with the September 2023 AGM.

Charges register data reflects the fifteen charges registered against the corporate identification number as of the current public records. Values are as filed and may differ from the actual drawn balance at any point in time.

The insolvency status is as reflected in the public records as of the date of this article. The tribunal-order dates (26 September 2025 and 8 December 2025) are drawn from Form INC-28 filings on the corporate registrar record. The 12 January 2026 auditor resignation is drawn from Form ADT-3. The specific contents of the two tribunal orders, and the identity of the petitioning creditor, the appointed Resolution Professional, and the case number, would require the underlying tribunal orders themselves, which are not surfaced in the form-level filing metadata alone.

FY2024 and FY2025 annual accounts have not been filed on the public records as of this article's date. When they are filed, or when a resolution plan is approved by the tribunal, this article will be updated to reflect the additional disclosure.